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I INTRODUCTION 
The "elephant" was the general theme of a world conference 
organised for the 20th anniversary of the International Memorisation 
Competition.1 The participating countries had to select a subject 
pertaining to this large mammal.  The German delegation opened the 
event with a paper entitled: "The Elephant: Physical and Metaphysical 
Issues". The French followed and their communication was "The 
Elephant: The Most Exquisite Recipes".  Later, it was the English 
delegation’s turn and they spoke on "The Elephant: Financial and 
Banking Aspects". Many others took the stand and, to close the 
conference, the Canadian delegation presented a paper entitled: "The 
Elephant: Of Federal Jurisdiction or Provincial Jurisdiction?"2
Of course, this anecdote is meant to illustrate how important 
constitutional matters are in Canada; some even say that they are a 
  
*  Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal. 
1  The theme was of course linked to the adage "having an elephant's memory". 
2  The author of this paper first heard this story in 1992 from Benoît Pelletier, then 
professor of law at the University of Ottawa and now member of Québec's provincial 
legislature. Roderick McDonald recently referred to a similar anecdote in "Three 
Centuries of Constitution Making in Canada: Will There be a Fourth?" (1996) 30 U 
British Columbia L Rev 211, 213. 
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collective obsession. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the debate 
about the Kyoto Protocol3 in Canada has largely revolved (similarly to 
the elephant) around the issue of whether its implementation falls within 
federal or provincial jurisdiction.  
This paper examines fundamental questions concerning the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in the Canadian federation. After a 
presentation of this international instrument and a general consideration 
of Canada's constitutional framework, the discussion focuses on the 
question of the division of legislative competences over foreign affairs. 
In the conclusion, some recommendations are formulated to overcome 
potential constitutional problems in implementing the Kyoto Protocol in 
Canada. 
II KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The expression global warming refers to the phenomenon whereby 
greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere prevent part of the sun's 
thermal radiations from being reflected back into space. Many human 
activities, especially those involving the combustion of fossil fuels like 
coal, oil and gas, have substantially increased concentrations of those 
gases. The rising temperatures thus caused have profound adverse effects 
not only on the environment but also on people's health and even on the 
world economy. It is in this general context that the Kyoto Protocol must 
be understood. 
Marking 20 years since the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, the Conference on Environment and Development held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 had an ambitious agenda and produced, along 
with the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development4 and other 
soft law instruments, two global agreements: the Convention on 
Biological Diversity5 and the Framework Convention on Climate 
  
3  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(11 December 1997) 37 ILM 22. 
4  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) (3-14 June 
1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Volume 1); 31 ILM 876. 
5  Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818. 
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Change.6 The objective of the latter is to stabilize the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases in order to allow "economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner."7 A new round of 
negotiations was launched in 1995 to give teeth to the general 
commitments, which led to a protocol adopted on 11 December 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan. 
The Kyoto Protocol establishes legally binding greenhouse gas 
emission targets for industrialised countries listed in its Annex I. The 
reductions are quite modest, about 5,2 per cent below the 1990 levels of 
emission, which must be attained within the period of 2008-2012. This 
international instrument was to come into force through a ratification 
threshold of 55 states responsible for 55 per cent of the 1990 total 
emission of greenhouse gases. When the United States, responsible for 
36 per cent of the 1990 emissions, abandoned the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001, President George W Bush calling it "fatally flawed",8 it became 
clear that the Agreement could only materialize with the Russian 
Federation's ratification. After a somewhat long period of pleadings and 
horse-trading, President Vladimir Putin agreed in November 2004 to be 
part of this historic development in addressing global warming.9
III CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Canada is a federation.  What is perhaps less well-known is that a so-
called "imperial statute", adopted by the British Parliament on 29 March 
1867, created the Canadian federation.10 By Royal Proclamation, the first 
  
6  Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992) 1771 UNTS 107; 31 ILM 
849. 
7  Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 6, Art 2. 
8  "Compromise Saves Climate Treaty" (21 July 2001) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1452315.stm> (last accessed 6 December 2004). 
9  "Putin Clears Way for Kyoto Treaty" (5 November 2004) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3985669.stm> (last accessed 14 December 
2004). 
10  British North America Act 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 6 which became after 1982 
the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. These changes were created by a 
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day of July 1867 was designated as the date for the entry into force of 
this statute, which became the core instrument of the Canadian 
Constitution.11 For the present purposes, it is important to emphasise two 
elements of this first chapter of Canada's modern political and legal 
history. First, the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) did not create a sovereign 
and independent country;12 Canada indeed remained a "Dominion" 
within the British Empire. As Peter Hogg explained:13
But the BNA Act did not mark any break with the colonial past.  
Independence from the United Kingdom was not desired or even 
contemplated for the future.  The new Dominion, although enjoying a 
considerable degree of self-government, remained a British colony.  In 
fact, of course, after 1867, there was an evolution to full independence, 
but it was a gradual process continuing well into the twentieth century. 
One must also realise that there was no provision in the Constitution Act 
1867 (UK) dealing with the competence over foreign affairs. These 
issues thus remained the exclusive responsibility of the British imperial 
power.14
  
piece of legislation adopted in Westminster, namely, the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 
11, which includes in Schedule B the Constitution Act 1982 (UK), containing inter 
alia the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 
1982 (Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B) and the amending formula of the Constitution 
Part V. 
11  Department of Justice Canada A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982 
(Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1989) 2, note 4. 
12  According to the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (26 
December 1933) 165 LNTS 19, art 1: "[t]he State as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a 
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other States." From the time of the creation of Canada up to the Statute of 
Westminster 1931 (UK), 22 Geo V, c 4, it was the fourth condition pertaining to 
international personality that was not formally present. 
13  P W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3 ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1992) 4-5. 
14  See generally A B Keith The Dominions as Sovereign States (Macmillan, London, 
1938). 
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The other element to underline is the distribution of legislative powers 
in the Canadian Constitution. Instead of a unitary authority, the British 
colonies in North America opted for a two-level structure of government: 
federal and provincial. One of the purposes of the Constitution Act 1867 
(UK) was to enumerate, in sections 91 and 92, the different matters 
falling under federal or provincial jurisdiction respectively.15 For 
example, the federal government has jurisdiction over trade and 
commerce, unemployment insurance, the postal service, military and 
naval defence, navigation and shipping, fisheries, currency and coinage, 
banking, weights and measures, bankruptcy and insolvency, copyrights, 
marriage and divorce, immigration and criminal law. On the other hand, 
the provincial governments have jurisdiction, inter alia, over public 
lands, the management of hospitals, municipal institutions, local works 
and undertakings, the celebration of marriage, property and civil rights, 
the administration of justice, penal offences and under section 92(16): 
"[g]enerally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
province."16
Neither section 91 nor section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) 
provides for any legislative competence regarding the negotiation, 
conclusion and ratification of international conventions. Neither do they 
say anything about the conduct of foreign affairs and other international 
issues.17
 
  
15  See G P Browne The Judicial Committee and the British North America Act. An 
Analysis of the Interpretative Scheme for the Distribution of Legislative Powers 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967) 36, who opined that such an 
enumeration for both levels of government is unusual and that a common alternative 
is to give a list of competences for one level of government and to declare that the 
rest falls within the jurisdiction of the other. 
16  Constitution Act 1867 (UK), above n 10. 
17  See M H M Kidwai "International Personality and the British Dominions: Evolution 
and Accomplishment" (1976) 9 U QLJ 76, 114. 
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IV JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The Constitution Act 1867 (UK) does not per se give jurisdiction to 
the federal Parliament or to the provincial legislatures over foreign 
affairs stricto sensu. In 1867, Canada was not sovereign and 
independent. It did not enjoy international personality to make its own 
representations among the members of the society of nations.18 There 
existed, however, a constitutional provision that is very relevant here, 
dealing with the incorporation of international conventions, which must 
be understood in light of the dualistic approach Canada follows in regard 
to treaty norms. The situation prevailing in 1867 progressively changed, 
first with respect to the conclusion of international agreements and, later, 
as regards the implementation of international conventions. 
A Section 132 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) 
A careful reading of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) reveals that there 
is only one provision that explicitly deals with the foreign affairs of what 
was then the Dominion of Canada.19 It is section 132, which reads as 
follows: 
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers 
necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any 
Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign 
  
18  At the time, and to a large extent even today in spite of the developments in 
international law since World War II, the system of international relations was 
founded on the idea of a society of nations independent from one another and, by 
virtue of the notion of state sovereignty, free of any legal constraints from a superior 
order. This is the so-called "Vattellian" system of international relations, based on 
Emer de Vattel's work, Le Droit des Gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués 
à la conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains (2 ed, London, 1758); see 
also the translation by J Chitty The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of 
Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Johnson Law 
Booksellers, Philadelphia, 1863). On Vattel and his contribution to international law, 
see S Beaulac "Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty" (2003) 5 J 
History Int'l L 237. 
19  See G A Beaudoin La Constitution du Canada: institutions, partage des pouvoirs, 
droits et libertés (Wilson & Lafleur, Montréal, 1991) 566. 
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Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign 
Countries. 
The federal Parliament was thus habilitated to implement norms 
arising from treaties concluded by the British imperial authority. More 
importantly, this power to adopt incorporating legislation was over 
international conventions covering subjects falling both under section 91 
and section 92.20
It is appropriate at this point to refer to two passages in section 132 
which, it will be seen, have justified in part the conclusion according to 
which this constitutional provision is now obsolete since Canada has 
become independent and thus empowered to negotiate and conclude its 
own international agreements. The first passage refers to the obligation 
of Canada and the provinces "as Part of the British Empire". Also, in 
fine, section 132 makes reference to "Treaties between the Empire and 
such Foreign Countries". Before seeing how these passages were 
interpreted, it is necessary to briefly discuss the issue of treaty 
incorporation into Canadian law in order to better understand the 
relevant constitutional context. 
B Dualistic Approach for Treaty Norms 
An important feature of Canadian constitutional law is the approach 
adopted in regard to the incorporation in domestic law of legal norms 
arising from international conventions. Being influenced by British 
practice,21 Canadian courts have favoured the so-called "dualistic" 
  
20  See Hogg, above n 13, 290:  
This provision rather clearly grants to the federal Parliament the power 
to enact legislation which is necessary to implement treaties but it 
refers only to treaties between the "British Empire" and foreign 
countries. The reason why s 132 is framed in these terms is that in 
1867 the conduct of international affairs for the entire Empire was still 
firmly vested in the British (imperial) government, and it was the 
British government which negotiated, signed and ratified all treaties 
which applied to the Empire or to any part of the Empire. 
21  See E D Dickinson "L'interprétation et l'application du droit international dans les 
pays anglo-américains" (1932) 40 Recueil des Cours 305; A D McNair 
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approach when it comes to implementing treaty norms,22 as opposed to 
the "monist" view.23 This principle24 was set out by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in the Labour Conventions case,25 where 
Lord Atkin famously wrote:26
Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making 
of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if 
they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative 
action. 
It follows that treaty norms must be formally transformed and 
incorporated through the adoption of domestic legislation in order for 
these international obligations to become part of the Canadian legal
  
"L'application et l'interprétation des traités d'après la jurisprudence britannique" 
(1933) 43 Recueil des Cours 247; I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 
(5 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 42-49. 
22  According to the dualistic theory, international law is only applicable domestically if 
there has been some kind of incorporation into the domestic legal order, the two 
systems being considered as separate.  See generally H Triepel Droit international et 
droit interne (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1920). 
23  Pursuant to the monist theory, international law forms part of the law of the land 
without the need for internal implementation, a position based on the view that both 
laws are fundamentally part of the same legal system. Monism can take two forms: 
international law has primacy over domestic law or municipal law trumps 
international law. Hans Kelsen is the most notorious defender of the monist theory.  
He favoured the former form of monism: see H Kelsen "La transformation du droit 
international en droit interne" (1936) 43 RGDIP 5. See also generally G Sperduti 
"Dualism and Monism: A Confrontation to be Overcome?" (1977) 3 Italian Y B Int'l 
L 31. 
24  See R St J Macdonald "The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic 
Law in Canada" in R St J Macdonald and others (eds) Canadian Perspectives on 
International Law and Organization (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974) 
88. 
25  Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Ontario (Labour Conventions) 
[1937] AC 326 (PC). 
26  Labour Conventions, above n 25, 347. See also Chung Chi Cheung v The Queen 
[1939] AC 160, 168 (PC). 
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 order.27 In the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition, this approach is 
mainly explained by the doctrine of the division of legislative and 
executive powers and that of supremacy of Parliament.28
It is interesting to note, however, that this dualistic approach seems to 
have progressively lost strength, at least implicitly, following a series of 
recent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada.29 Especially since the 
decision in Baker,30 it is now clear that treaty norms that are 
unimplemented in domestic law can nevertheless play an important role 
in interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 198231 and 
in construing ordinary legislation. In Baker, Justice L'Heureux-Dubé 
wrote the following for the majority:32
 
  
27  See the following Canadian cases: Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co 
Ltd v Pigeon Timber Co Ltd [1932] SCR 495, 510; Francis v The Queen [1956] SCR 
618, 625-626; Capital Cities Communications v Canadian Radio-Television 
Commission [1978] 2 SCR 141, 173; Reference Re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act (Alb) [1987] 1 SCR 313, 348-349. 
28  See Brownlie, above n 21, 46:  
In England, and also it seems in most Commonwealth countries, the 
conclusion and ratification of treaties are within the prerogative of the 
Crown (or its equivalent), and if a transformation doctrine were not 
applied, the Crown could legislate for the subject without 
parliamentary consent.  As a consequence treaties are only part of 
English law if an enabling Act of Parliament has been passed.  
29  See on this issue S Beaulac "Arrêtons de dire que les tribunaux au Canada sont  liés 
par le droit international" (2004) 38 Rev Jur Thémis 359; S Beaulac "National 
application of International Law: The Statutory Interpretation Perspective" (2004) 42 
Canadian Y B Int'l L (forthcoming). 
30  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
31  See for example Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson [1989] 1 SCR 1038; R v 
Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697; R v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283; Canadian Foundation for 
Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General) [2004] SCC 4. 
32  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), above n 30, paras 69-71 
(emphasis added). 
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I agree with the respondent and the Court of Appeal that the Convention 
has not been implemented by Parliament. Its provisions therefore have no 
direct application within Canadian law. Nevertheless, the values reflected 
in international human rights law may help inform the contextual 
approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.   
This new trend, albeit still at the experimentation stage, has been 
followed by the Supreme Court of Canada.33 Because it remains formally 
necessary in Canada to implement international conventions in domestic 
law through legislation, the question is which level of government has 
the competence to do so. Pursuant to section 132 of the Constitution Act 
1867 (UK),34 when Canada was still a British Dominion, the central 
government had such legislative power, whether the treaty obligations 
were falling under federal or provincial jurisdiction. As will be examined 
below, this situation changed after Canada became an independent state. 
C Authority over the Conclusion of International Conventions 
In 1867, it was the executive branch of the British imperial 
government that had power to negotiate, conclude and ratify Canada's 
international conventions. Gradually, however, Canada obtained more 
autonomy over its own international relations with the members of the 
society of nations. Already in 1877, Canada was not considering itself 
bound by commercial treaties to which it had not consented.35 At the end 
of World War I, Canada represented its own interests at the Paris Peace 
Conference and, albeit as a British Dominion, did sign the Versailles 
Treaty in 1919. Shortly afterwards, Canada began to fully exercise its 
authority to negotiate, conclude and ratify international agreements, 
  
33  See 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech  Société d'arrosage) v Town of Hudson [2001] 2 
SCR 241; Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 
3; Schreiber v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 3 SCR 269. See also S Beaulac 
"The Suresh Case and Unimplemented Treaty Norms" (2002) 15 RQDI 221; S 
Beaulac "Recent Developments on the Role of International Law in Canadian 
Statutory Interpretation" (2004) 25 Statute L Rev 19. 
34  Constitution Act 1867 (UK), above n 10. 
35  See Beaudoin, above n 19, 567. 
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including the 1923 Halibut Fisheries Treaty. This feature of state 
sovereignty was consecrated in 1931 with the Statute of Westminster.36
Under British constitutional and imperial law, the power to conclude 
and ratify treaties was a Crown prerogative.37 In Canada, it was thus the 
representative of the British monarchy, the Governor General, who came 
to exercise Crown prerogatives, including treaty-making powers. Similar 
to Great Britain, the evolution towards a constitutional monarchy in 
Canada meant that a practice developed whereby Crown prerogatives 
were exercised at the request and under the advice of the Canadian 
government,38 which did not require the participation of Parliament 
however.39 The 1947 Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor 
General of Canada40 confirmed that the executive branch of the federal 
government was now entrusted with the Crown prerogatives for Canada, 
including the power to negotiate, conclude and ratify treaties. The 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Labour Conventions case41 – 
the Privy Council did not address this point – also expressed the view 
that the central government was vested with such authority, whether the 
conventions dealt with matters falling under section 91 or section 92 of 
the Constitution Act 1867 (UK).42
  
36  See A-M Jacomy-Millette L'introduction et l'application des traités internationaux 
au Canada (LGDJ, Paris, 1971) 5-21; P E Corbett and H A Smith Canada and 
World Politics (Faber & Gwyer, London, 1928) 42-69. 
37  See A E Gotlieb Canadian Treaty-Making (Butterworths, Toronto, 1968) 4-5; P N 
Baker "Les Dominions sont-ils vraiment des personnes du droit des gens?" (1927) 19 
Recueil des Cours 247. 
38  See Hogg, above n 13, 229. 
39  See J-Y Grenon "De la conclusion des traités et de leur mise en oeuvre au Canada" 
(1962) 40 Canadian Bar Rev 151, 152-153. 
40  Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor General of Canada RSC 1985 
Appendix II, no 31. 
41  Reference re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, The Minimum Wages 
Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act [1936] SCR 461, 462, 501. 
42  Although, unlike Canada, Canadian provinces do not have legal personality in 
international law, they can nevertheless conclude agreements with foreign authorities 
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D Shared Authority over the Implementation of International 
Conventions 
Given that the dualistic approach in Canada requires the 
transformation of international conventions into domestic law, there is 
another important constitutional question beside that of the competence 
to conclude such agreements; namely, which level of government has 
jurisdiction over the incorporation of treaty norms.  Essentially, there are 
two possible answers. First, pursuant to section 132 of the Constitution 
Act 1867 (UK), the central Parliament would have such power, whether 
the treaties deal with federal or provincial matters. Secondly, based on 
the subject of the international conventions, their implementation 
through legislation would follow the division of legislative authority 
under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK). 
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council favoured 
the second position in the 1937 Labour Conventions case. This was not 
the first time, however, that the Privy Council considered this Canadian 
constitutional issue of treaty transformation. In three earlier cases,43 the 
Lords appeared to lean towards a general jurisdiction for the federal 
government to implement treaties.44 But it is really only in the Labour 
Conventions case that the issue was directly addressed, the decision 
 
  
on matters within their jurisdiction: see Grenon, above n 39. This is the type of 
administrative accords that the province of Quebec has reached with many states of 
the Francophonie, although secessionist governments have argued for a more 
official status in dealing with international relations: see Jacomy-Millette, above n 
36, 75-87; J-Y Morin "La personnalité internationale du Québec" (1984) 1 RQDI 
163. 
43  Attorney-General of British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada (1924) AC 
222 (PC); In re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (1932) AC 54 
(PC); In re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada (1932) AC 
304 (PC). 
44  See J S Ewart "The Radio Case" (1932) 10 Canadian Bar Rev 298, 301-302. 
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which has since marked the constitutional consciousness of Canadian 
lawyers.45
The matter brought before the Privy Council in the Labour 
Conventions case was on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which had been seized directly through a reference made by the 
Governor General in Council. The issue at the centre of the case was 
whether or not the federal Parliament had legislative authority to 
implement agreements concluded under the auspices of the International 
Labour Organization, namely, the Hours of Work (Industry) 
Convention,46 the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention47 and the 
Minimum Wage-fixing Machinery Convention.48 The federal Parliament 
incorporated them into Canadian law with the Weekly Rest in Industrial 
Undertakings Act 1935,49 the Minimum Wages Act 193550 and the 
Limitation of Hours of Work Act 1935,51 although it was admitted that 
such legislation would ordinarily fall under provincial legislative 
  
45  Among the many comments on the Labour Conventions case see N A M Mackenzie 
"Canada: The Treaty-Making Power" (1937) 18 British Y B Int'l L 172; F R Scott 
"The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Canadian Bar Rev 
485; A B Elkin "De la compétence du Canada pour conclure les traités 
internationaux: Étude sur le statut juridique des Dominions britanniques" (1938) 45 
RGDIP 658; F R Scott "Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wright's Undisclosed 
Dissent" (1956) 34 Canadian Bar Rev 114; G J Szablowski "Creation and 
Implementation of Treaties in Canada" (1956) 34 Canadian Bar Rev 28; E 
McWhinney "Federal Constitutional Law and the Treaty-Making Power" (1957) 35 
Canadian Bar Rev 842; G L Morris "The Treaty Making Power: A Canadian 
Dilemma" (1967) 45 Canadian Bar Rev 478. 
46  Convention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to Eight in the 
Day and Forty-eight in the Week (28 November 1919) 38 UNTS 17. 
47  Convention Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial 
Undertakings (17 November 1921) 38 UNTS 187. 
48  Convention Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery (16 June 
1928) 39 UNTS 3.   
49  Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act SC 1935, 25 & 26 Geo V, c 14. 
50  Minimum Wages Act SC 1935, 25 & 26 Geo V, c 44. 
51  Limitation of Hours of Work Act SC 1935, 25 & 26 Geo V, c 63. 
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authority pursuant to the competence over property and civil rights in 
section 92(13) of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK). 
It was noted above that, unlike the Supreme Court, the Privy Council 
did not consider it necessary to decide the question of whether the central 
government had exclusive power for the conclusion of international 
conventions; its ruling was limited to the question of legislative authority 
to implement those agreements.52 The first part of the reasons for 
judgment dealt with section 132 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 
which gave jurisdiction to the federal government to transform into 
domestic law all treaties concluded by the British imperial authority. The 
Privy Council referred to the fact that Canada's international treaties – 
including the three in the present case – were now concluded by an 
independent country, not by a British Dominion. Section 132 had thus 
become obsolete and, accordingly, was of no utility to decide the 
question at issue. Lord Atkin explained thus:53
While it is true, as was pointed out in the Radio case, that it was not 
contemplated in 1867 that the Dominion would possess treaty-making 
powers, it is impossible to strain the section so as to cover the 
uncontemplated event. 
This is how, in a somewhat summary fashion, the Privy Council 
dismissed the argument based on section 132 of the Constitution Act 
1867 (UK). Indeed, the relevance of this provision could have certainly 
been saved, especially in view of the now notorious remarks of Lord 
Sankey in Edwards v Attorney General for Canada,54 comparing the 
Canadian Constitution to a living tree capable of growth and expansion 
within its natural limits.55
  
52  Labour Conventions, above n 25, 249. 
53  Labour Conventions, above n 25, 250. 
54  Edwards v Attorney General for Canada [1930] AC 124 (PC). 
55  Edwards v Attorney General for Canada, above n 54, 136. See also V C MacDonald 
"The Privy Council and the Canadian Constitution" (1951) 29 Canadian Bar Rev 
1021; W P M Kennedy "The Interpretation of the BNA Act" (1943) 8 CLJ 146. 
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Lord Atkin also dismissed the contention put forward by the Attorney 
General for Canada according to which the federal government had the 
legislative competence by virtue of its residual power to transform all 
international conventions into the domestic legal order. The federal 
nature of the Canadian Constitution was the main reason given in 
rejecting the claim:56
It would be remarkable that while the Dominion could not initiate 
legislation, however, desirable, which affected civil rights in the 
Provinces, yet its Government not responsible to the Provinces nor 
controlled by Provincial Parliaments need only agree with a foreign 
country to enact such legislation, and its Parliament would be forthwith 
clothed with authority to affect Provincial rights to the full extent of such 
agreement.  Such a result would appear to undermine the constitutional 
safeguards of Provincial constitutional autonomy … In other words, the 
Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign countries, clothe 
itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which 
gave it birth. 
Accordingly, the legislative authority to implement international 
treaties is not of the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government of 
Canada. It is the subject-matter of the agreement that determines which 
legislative authority has jurisdiction to incorporate its provisions into the 
domestic legal order, pursuant to sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution 
Act 1867 (UK). 
It is noteworthy that the Attorney General for Canada had expressed 
concerns that such a shared power regarding treaty implementation 
would significantly reduce the flexibility and efficacy of the federal 
government as far as Canada's foreign policies are concerned. Lord Atkin 
replied as follows:57
It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is 
incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of 
  
56  Labour Conventions, above n 25, 352. 
57  Labour Conventions, above n 25, 353-354. 
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legislative powers, Dominion and Provincial together, she is fully 
equipped. But the legislative powers remain distributed, and if in the 
exercise of her new functions derived from her new international status 
Canada incurs obligations they must, so far as legislation be concerned, 
when they deal with Provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the 
totality of powers, in other words by co-operation between the Dominion 
and the Provinces. While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures 
and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments 
which are an essential part of her original structure. 
The legislative authority to implement international treaty norms into 
domestic law is thus shared between the two levels of government in 
Canada, thus respecting the federal character of the Canadian 
Constitution. 
One must underscore, however, that the federal nature of the country 
has no effect on the international plane and, in particular, on Canada's 
responsibility in cases of failure to fulfil its international obligations.  In 
international law, the state is one and indivisible for the purposes of its 
responsibility.58 Thus, the distribution of powers under the Canadian 
Constitution does not have any incidence on the fact that its constituting 
entities (the provinces) have no international legal personality, have no 
international representative capacity and cannot be internationally 
liable.59 In international law, it is generally the central authorities of 
federal states which have these attributes.60 With respect to international 
responsibility, a state cannot rely on its internal constitutional structure to 
justify a violation of an international obligation.61 There is also a 
  
58  R Jennings and A Watts Oppenheim's International Law (vol 1, 9 ed, Longman, 
London, 1992) 540. 
59  The most authoritative judicial ruling supporting this proposition was made by Chief 
Justice Duff in the Supreme Court decision in the Labour Conventions case: 
Reference re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, The Minimum Wages 
Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, above n 41, 496. 
60  See Jennings and Watts, above n 58, 252. 
61  See Jennings and Watts, above n 58, 254. 
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presumption, codified in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties,62 to the effect that all states, including federal states, 
must fulfil their obligations on the whole of their national territory, save 
of course express provision to the contrary such as in federal clauses.63
Consequently, even though the authority to implement international 
conventions is shared between the two levels of legislative authority in 
Canada, it is the federal government that would be held responsible, on 
the international plane, in cases of violation of treaty obligations, no 
matter whether such norms are to be implemented at the federal or 
provincial level. A state cannot use its internal law or even its 
constitution (including its federal nature) as a justification for failing to 
meet its international commitments.64 As the Permanent Court of 
International Justice declared in the Polish Nationals in Danzig65 case: 
"[a] State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution 
with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international 
law or treaties in force."66 It follows that, if a province refuses to 
implement international obligations contracted by Canada, such as those 
in the Kyoto Protocol, the federal government on behalf of the country as 
a whole (not the actual province) would be held internationally 
responsible. 
  
62  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 
679. 
63  On these clauses in general see B R Opeskin "Federal States in the International 
Legal Order" (1996) 43 Netherland Int'l L Rev 353; R B Looper "'Federal State' 
Clauses in Multilateral Instruments" (1955-56) 32 British Y B Int'l L 162. 
64  The basic authority for this proposition is the arbitration decision in the Alabama 
Claims case between the United States and the United Kingdom in 1872, reproduced 
in J B Moore History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the 
United States has been a Party (vol 1, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 
1898) 653. This rule was codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
above n 62, art 27. 
65  Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (Poland v Danzig) (Advisory Opinion) 
[1931] PCIJ (Series A/B, No 44). 
66  Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, above n 65, 24. 
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V CONCLUSION: THE KYOTO OBLIGATIONS 
After an autumn of federal-provincial debates and disputes, Canada 
officially ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 16 December 2002.  Because of 
the dualistic approach adopted by Canada as regards international 
treaties, the ratification of the Protocol is far from putting an end to the 
quarrels between Ottawa and the provinces.  Indeed, the transformation 
of this Protocol into domestic law will most likely raise constitutional 
questions of distribution of powers with respect to environmental 
matters. This is an area of shared jurisdiction between the federal and 
provincial governments, not least since the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) 
does not list the environment as a head of legislative competence.67  
Although the federal Parliament adopted the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act,68 the case law clearly states that the provinces are to play 
the principal role in the protection of the environment in Canada.69
Thus the a priori conclusion is that the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in Canada will require some legislative or executive action from 
the provinces. Given that it potentially concerns all human activities 
contributing to greenhouse gas emissions, whether from industries, 
governments or even individuals, the Kyoto Protocol undoubtedly falls 
under provincial jurisdiction by virtue of several heads of legislative 
competence in section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK).70 It is 
certainly possible, therefore, that the transformation in Canada of the 
international obligations set out in the Protocol will become problematic 
if provinces do not sufficiently collaborate with the federal government 
  
67  See on this issue F Chevrette "Fédéralisme et protection de l'environnement" in N 
Duplé (ed) Le droit à la qualité de l'environnement: un droit en devenir, un droit à 
définir (Québec-Amérique, Montréal, 1988) 337; G A Beaudoin "La protection de 
l'environnement et ses implications en droit constitutionnel"  (1977) 23 McGill LJ 
207; D Gibson "Constitutional Jurisdiction over Environmental Management in 
Canada" (1973) 23 U Toronto LJ 54. 
68  Canadian Environmental Protection Act RSC 1985 c 16 (4th Supp). 
69  See R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 401; Friends of the Oldman 
River v Canada [1992] 1 SCR 3; R v Hydro-Québec [1997] 3 SCR 213.   
70  See Beaudoin, above n 19, 614; Hogg, above n 13, 733-734. 
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to introduce measures aimed at reducing the emission of greenhouse 
gases. 
In this pessimistic, albeit plausible, scenario, Canada would run the 
risk of being unable to meet its international commitments by 2012. Such 
a violation would not go unsanctioned because Article 18 of the Kyoto 
Protocol not only prescribes precise environmental targets, but it further 
provides for the creation of effective control procedures and 
mechanisms:  
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective 
procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-
compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the 
development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the 
cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance.  Any procedures 
and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall 
be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. 
There is no doubt that these control procedures and mechanisms will 
be adopted now that the Kyoto Protocol has entered into force. The 
consequence is that the Kyoto Protocol has some real "bite" and could 
see Canada be held liable for failing to comply with its provisions, even 
if such a violation would emanate from provincial inaction. 
A possible solution to this situation would be to recognise to the 
federal Parliament the necessary legislative authority on the environment 
in order to adopt the required measures to meet the Protocol's targets.71 
  
71  The question of federal legislative competence on the environment could be based 
on the national emergency doctrine (exceptional circumstances in order to meet 
Canada's international commitments) or certainly on the national dimension doctrine, 
which is still available according to R v Hydro-Québec, above n 69, 288-289. For the 
latter doctrine to be applied, the subject-matter "must be marked by a singleness, 
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of 
provincial concern" (R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, above n 69, 432) and must 
also comply with Canada's federalist tenets. It is most likely that the Kyoto 
Protocol's international commitments, which are very precise, indeed, as to the 
required reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, meet the national dimension 
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Another option to make sure that it is implemented across the country 
would be to revisit the Labour Conventions case. On a few occasions 
already, the Supreme Court of Canada has given signs that it might re-
examine the issue of federal general authority to incorporate international 
conventions.72 The best-known statement to that effect was made by 
Chief Justice Laskin in MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd,73 who wrote 
that one can "support a reconsideration of the Labour Conventions 
case"74 which could hold that the central Parliament can "pass legislation 
in implementation of an international obligation by Canada under a 
treaty or Convention (being legislation which it would be otherwise 
beyond its competence)."75 This obiter dictum was endorsed by Justice 
Dickson in Schneider v La Reine.76
The situation in Australia, another federation belonging to the British 
constitutional tradition, may certainly be used as a precedent for the 
"centralist thesis". It is the Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional 
Act 1900 (UK),77 also an "imperial" statute adopted by the British 
Parliament, which is the main Australian constitutional text.78 Similar to 
section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK), section 51 of the 
Australian Constitution contains the list of legislative competences 
entrusted to the Commonwealth (that is, the federal) government.79 
  
doctrine strict conditions, especially in the context where the country would be held 
responsible on the international plane for non-compliance. 
72  In 1956, Justice Kerwin raised the question of whether it might be appropriate to 
reconsider the Labour Conventions case. See Francis v The Queen, above n 27, 621. 
73  MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd [1977] 2 SCR 134. 
74  MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd, above n 73, 169. 
75  MacDonald v Vapor Canada Ltd, above n 73, 169. 
76  Schneider v La Reine [1982] 2 SCR 112, 134. 
77  Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional Act 1900 (UK), 63 & 64 Vict, c 12. 
78  See generally C Howard Australian Federal Constitutional Law (3 ed, Law Book, 
Sydney, 1985). 
79  Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional Act 1900 (UK), above n 77, s 51 now 
enumerates forty heads of legislative power for the Commonwealth authority. 
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However, there is no equivalent to section 92 of the Canadian 
Constitution; rather, section 107 of the Australian Constitution provides 
that all the matters not specifically reserved for the Commonwealth fall 
under state (that is, provincial) jurisdiction.80
Like Canada, Australia favours a dualistic approach regarding the 
transformation of international conventional norms into domestic law.81 
Unlike Canada, however, the Australian Constitution expressly gives 
competence over foreign affairs to the Commonwealth.82 Section 51 of 
the Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is the basis upon which a 
general jurisdiction has been recognised to the central authority in 
Australia, not only to negotiate and conclude treaties,83 but also to 
implement international conventional norms into domestic law, whether 
the subject falls within Commonwealth or state legislative competence.84
  
80  Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional Act 1900 (UK), above n 77, s 107 reads 
as follows:  
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or 
becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively 
vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the 
Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, 
as the case may be.   
 See also Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1928) 28 
CLR 129, 154. 
81  See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286-
287. 
82  Commonwealth of Australia Constitutional Act 1900 (UK), above n 77, s 51(xxix) 
provides: "[t]he Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth in relation to 
... external affairs" (emphasis added). 
83  See L Zines "The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of 
the Commonwealth" in L Zines (ed) Commentaries on the Australian Constitution: A 
Tribute to Geoffrey Sawer (Butterworths, Sydney, 1977) 1. 
84  See R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen 
(1982) 56 ALJR 625 (HCA); The Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.  
See also G Sawer "The External Affairs Power" (1984) 14 Federal L Rev 199. 
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Without going as far as to advocate the Australian example of general 
federal jurisdiction for the incorporation of treaty norms, the 
international obligations set out in the Kyoto Protocol command a 
broader authority for the Canadian federal government to implement 
international environmental agreements within domestic law. This would 
avoid the danger of constitutional disputes entailing the responsibility of 
Canada on the international plane for failure to comply with its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.85
  
85  Before he was appointed to the judiciary, Gérard La Forest wrote that a flexible and 
pragmatic approach to ss 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867 (UK) should allow 
the federal government to exercise, in some rare cases, a general jurisdiction to 
implement international conventions. See G V La Forest "The Labour Conventions 
Case Revisited" (1974) 12 Canadian Y B Int'l L 137, 151-152 (emphasis added): 
This may just possibly include a court's taking into account the fact 
that in regulating a matter on the international plane, the federal 
government must necessarily (especially in the case of multilateral 
treaties) accept an arrangement as a whole.  Following this approach, 
it could uphold legislation implementing a treaty largely falling within 
the ordinary bounds of federal competence but also touching on 
related matters that would in a purely internal setting be regarded as 
within provincial competence.    
